Solutions / Account takeover
The login still works. The person changed.
Credential stuffing, session hijacking, and MFA fatigue all look like a valid sign-in. Cerberus reads the actor behind the session, not just the token it carries.
step-up authblockalertIllustrative product interface. The figures shown are an example of how Cerberus presents a detection, not benchmark or performance results.
Valid credentials
Stolen or stuffed passwords pass every check your auth layer makes.
Looks like a sign-in
One request in isolation is indistinguishable from a real user.
MFA is not enough
Push fatigue and session theft route straight around a second factor.
How it works
Caught by the actor, not the request.
Cerberus baselines each account and scores every sign-in against the actor's real history.
Coverage
What Cerberus catches here.
Credential stuffing
Reused breach credentials replayed at scale across accounts.
Session hijacking
Stolen tokens used from a new actor with no session history.
MFA fatigue
Push bombing and prompt-spam that wears a user into approving.
Brute force
Slow and distributed password guessing under the rate limit.
Account farming
Mass creation and warming of accounts for later abuse.
Post-takeover fraud
Profile, payout, and contact changes that follow a takeover.
FAQ
Common questions
Why does MFA not stop account takeover?
MFA authenticates the login event. It says nothing about the session that follows. Push fatigue wears a user into approving a prompt they did not initiate, and a stolen session token skips the login entirely. Both produce traffic that is authenticated, authorised, and wrong. The useful question after sign-in is not whether the credential was valid but whether the actor using it behaves like the account holder.
How do you catch credential stuffing that stays under the rate limit?
Rate limits count requests per IP or per endpoint. Distributed stuffing is designed around that: a few attempts per address across thousands of addresses never trips a per-source threshold. The attack is only visible at the population level, where the same credential list is being replayed against many accounts at once. Cerberus collapses attempts that share behaviour into a single actor, so a campaign spread across 14 addresses reads as one chain rather than 14 unremarkable trickles.
What changes when the account holder is an AI agent?
Agents hold credentials and carry sessions exactly as users do, so a hijacked agent session looks like ordinary agent traffic to anything watching the transport. What differs is the baseline: an agent's cadence, tool use and working hours are far more regular than a human's, which makes deviation easier to see rather than harder. Cerberus scores agent identities in the same pipeline as human ones, so takeover of a service account is not a separate product.
How is this different from bot detection?
Bot detection asks whether traffic is automated. Account takeover asks whether the actor is the right one. Those are different questions with different answers: a customer's own integration script is automation you want, and a stolen session driven by hand is a human you do not. Treating the two as one problem is why fingerprint-based defences both miss takeovers and block legitimate partners.
Stop the actor, not the user.
See Cerberus read your own traffic, human and agentic, in one walkthrough tailored to your stack.